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ASPIRING TO A MODEL OF
THE ENGAGED JUDGE
ELLEN YAROSHEFSKY*

In 1967, within months of his appointment by President Lyndon Johnson to the Federal Bench in Detroit, Judge Damon Keith,
[a] rookie judge and an African American . . . faced controversy almost immediately when, in an unusual confluence of
circumstance, four divisive cases landed on his docket-all of
which concerned hidden discriminatory practices that were
deeply woven into housing, education, employment, and police institutions. Keith shook the nation as he challenged the
status quo and faced off against angry crowds, the KKK, corporate America, and even a sitting U.S. President.'
In 1970, Judge Keith ordered citywide busing in Pontiac, Michigan, to help integrate the city's schools-a ruling that prompted
death threats against him and intense resistance by some white parents. 2 In August 1971, ten school buses in Pontiac were firebombed
3
by members of the Ku Klux Klan.
* Howard Lichtenstein Professor of Legal Ethics and Director of the Monroe
Freedman Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics at the Maurice A. Deane School
of Law at Hofstra University. I thank the staff of the NYU Annual Survey of
American Law for their work on this forum.
1. The Movie, THEDKDoc.com,
https://www.thedkdoc.com/the-movie
[https://perma.cc/TA45-LPG7] (last visited April 9, 2018).
2. DeNeen L. Brown, 'IDon'tScareEasily': A 94-Year-Oldjudge's Refusal to Bow to
Racism, Death Threats, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/i-don t-scare-easily-a-94-year-old-judges-refusal-to-bow-to-racism-deaththreats/2016/10/06/cc8a2004-88fa-11e6-b24f-a7f89eb68887-story.html?utm
term=.593461a6a1l5.
3. In 2002, in DetroitFree Press v. Ashcroft, when Keith was on the Sixth Circuit,
the Court ruled that President George W. Bush could not conduct deportation
hearings of terrorism suspects in secret. 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). In perhaps
his most famous ruling, challenging the claims of President Richard Nixon of executive power to suspend the Constitution, he told President Richard Nixon and
Attorney General John Mitchell that the administration could not wiretap telephones of citizens without a warrant. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074,
1078-79 (E.D. Mich. 1971). That ruling became known as "the Keith Decision."
U.S. v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971). In response, Nixon sued
Keith personally. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 444 F. 2d 651 (1971).
In United States v. United States District Court, the Supreme Court upheld Keith's
decision in a 9-0 decision. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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Judge Keith is one of the most prominent of the remarkable
judges who sought to advance the promise of the Civil Rights
Amendments in the Courts. As one of Justice Thurgood Marshall's
students at Howard University, Judge Keith embodied Justice Marshall's teachings. Judge Keith told a 2016 audience who came to
view a film about his life: "Thurgood would say, 'When you finish
Howard Law, I want you to use the law as a means for social
change,' . . . He used to tell us in class, 'Equal justice under the law
was written by white men.' 4 Justice Marshall urged his students to
make the country live up to its words. Judge Keith's judicial decisions promoted equal justice under the law. 5
Judge Keith is remarkable, but not unique. Noted federal court
judges in southern states endured personal threats for their brave
decisions in the civil rights era. For example, federal judge Frank
Johnson ruled that it was a violation of due process and equal protection to refuse to allow Rosa Parks to ride the bus in Montgomery,
Alabama. 6 This was the first time that Brown v. Board of Education7
was applied outside of a school context." Judge Johnson played a
leading role in setting the nation's course on civil rights, access to
public facilities, voting rights, school desegregation, and affirmative
action. 9 His Washington Post obituary stated: "Although he was a
man of the law rather than a reformer or a politician, many of his
decisions had social and political consequences that have become
touchstones of American life as the 20th century draws toward its
close." 10
4. Brown, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Robert D. McFadden, Frank M. Johnson Jr., Judge Whose Rulings Helped Desegregate the South, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/
1999/07/24/us/frank-m-johnsonjr-judge-whose-rulings-helped-desegregate-thesouth-dies-at-80.html [https://perma.cc/MQP6-EE6E].

7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. Id.
9. Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Carr v. Montgomery
Cty. Bd. of Ed., 289 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F.
Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala 1958); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala 1956).
He imposed federal mandates on state mental hospitals and state prisons for the
treatment of patients and inmates, previously regarded as being the exclusive responsibility of state governments and carved a path toward redefining the relationship between the federal government and the states. He was influential and
admired by many but was quite controversial.
10. J.Y. Smith, judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. Dies, WASH. POST (July 25, 1999),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/ 1999/07/25/judge-frank-m-

johnson-jr-dies/db3794fd6ffa-4d1f-9ed2-2de2e813eeaf/?utm

term=.696b361f95f9.
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In current times, among the most notable judges is Judge Jack
Weinstein, whose significant, creative, and brave contributions to
law and justice have been the subject of various symposia honoring
him." Judge Shira Scheindlin is another jurist who demonstrates
creativity and courage. In a widely anticipated ruling in 2013, the
judge issued a 198-page opinion concluding that the New York City
police department's "stop and frisk" program violated the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments because of the police department's
widespread practice, and de facto policy of, making and conducting
stops and frisks without reasonable suspicion.1 2 The Court imposed
somewhat unique and creative remedies to change police practices,
including appointing a monitor to oversee a process that involved a
broad range of community stakeholders in order to develop
reforms.1 3

Professor Roth's article New judicialActivism analyzes the most
recent wave of federal judges who take it upon themselves to advance fundamental rights through creative and brave judicial decisions.' 4 In addition to judge Scheindlin, federal judges, such as Jed

Rakoff, John Gleeson, Emmett Sullivan, Nancy Gertner, Frederic
Block, Nicholas Garaufis, Paul Cassell, and Mark Wolf, make decisions and impose remedies to ensure that the criminal justice system is fair, uphold the constitutional rights of the accused, and

demonstrate respect for individuals and for the justice system.' 5
They do so within the constraints of their role as judges by providing reasonable resolutions of controversies.' 6 As Professor Roth discusses, the last few decades marked a sea of change in federal and
state criminal justice systems.' 7 Federal courts, reacting in great
measure to the shift in power between judges and prosecutors
brought about by the 1986 Sentencing Guidelines, slowly began to
assume greater responsibility for their sentencing role and exercised discretion in imposing appropriate sentences.' 8 Professor
11. See, e.g., Symposium, A Roundtable Discussion to Honor One of America's Great
TrialJudges on the Occasion of His 80th Birthday, 12 J.L. & Po.'y 149 (2003).
12. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
13. Anil Kalhan, Stop and Frisk, JudicialIndependence, and the Ironies of Improper
Appearances, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1043, 1068 (2014) (discussing criticism and

unfair treatment ofJudge Scheindlin by the Second Circuit that the author calls a
"perfect storm of procedural irregularity").
14. Jessica A. Roth, The New District Court Activism in Criminaljustice Reform, 72
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187 (2018).
15. Id. at 272-73.
16. Id. at 194-95.
17. Id. at 228.
18. Id. at 221.
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Roth also discusses judicial activism in response to over-criminalization and to the hundreds of wrongful convictions.' 9 Many judges,
including those identified by Professor Roth, are willing to acknowledge that the criminal justice system's quest for fairness is often at
odds with reality.2 0
Criminal justice reform is often noted as the civil rights issue in
current times. 2 1 The United States' system of "mass incarceration,"
and its intersection with race and poverty, continues to receive significant and ongoing attention.2 2 Many stakeholders, including lawyers, policymakers, nonprofit organizations, governments, both
local and federal, and the public, have identified numerous reasons
for the significant increases in the United States jail and prison
populations and have offered various comprehensive policies and
programs to address mass incarceration.2 3 These efforts to reform
the criminal justice system focus on pretrial detention, sentencing
disparities, alternatives to incarceration, increased consideration of
collateral consequences in charging and sentencing, as well as increased attention towards implicit bias and how it affects decisionmaking. 24 The core of this work is primarily in state criminal justice
systems because more than 90% of criminal cases are adjudicated in
state and local courts.2 5 But within the federal system, the judges in
Professor Roth's article follow in the tradition of Judges Frank
Johnson, Damon Keith, Julius Waties Waring, and others, by providing creative remedies in their judicial opinions to address criminal
26
justice reform.
19. Id. at 198-99.
20. Id. at 254-55; Lisa Foster, judicial Responsibilityfor Justice in Criminal Courts,

46

L. Rrv. 21, 23 (2017).
21. Comprehensive Criminal Justice Reform Must Include Both Front End
and Back End Reform, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://civilrights.org/comprehensive-criminal-justice-reformmust-include-front-end-back-end-reform/ [https://perma.cc/HH7G-RDYT].
HOFSTRA

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Susan Klein & Ingrid Grobey, Debunking Claims of OvercriminalizationofFederal Law, 62 EMORY L. J. 1, 50 (2012).

25. Id. at 27.
26. See Roth, supra note 14; see also Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D.
Ala. 1956) (Johnson,J.); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala. 1958)
(Johnson, J.); United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971)
(Keith, J.); United States v. Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(Gleeson, J.); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(Scheindlin, J.); RicHARD GERGEL,, UNEXAMPLED COURAGE: THE BLINDING OF ScT.
ISAAC WOODARD AND THE AWAKENING OF PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN AND JUDGE J.
WATIES WARING (2019). Of course, one could ask why it took so many years for
judges to act and not simply defer to legislatures or other courts. Problems in the
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Beyond judicial opinions, judges such as Judge Jed Rakoff engage in public advocacy by giving speeches and writing editorials in
magazines and journals. Judge Rakoff famously said that judges
have the responsibility to end mass incarceration.2 7 Such commentary outside of judicial opinions is not a new phenomenon. In a
1997 article, former ChiefJudge Judith Kaye of the New York Court
of Appeals noted that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes gave an hourlong interview to a reporter about a recent opinion, and thatJustice
John Marshall published several rebuttals to criticisms of McCullough v. Maryland.2 8 Over the years, many Supreme Court justices
have given speeches and have made public pronouncements in order to advance civil and constitutional rights. 29 In recent times, Justice Scalia's speeches before the Federalist Society, and at
numerous events, have been credited with sparking the current
criminal justice system have been well known for many years and federal judges
have significant power to address many concerns, but they do not. They may often
agree that change is essential, but that "their hands are tied." A key example is
Strickland v. Washington, a case that set the standard for reversal of a conviction for
ineffective assistance of counsel. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). It requires a demonstration
that the lawyer's performance fell below the standard of reasonably competent
counsel and that, "but for" that performance, the result would be different. Id. It is
well known that the second prong, the prejudice prong, contributes to affirming
faulty convictions of the innocent. Adele Bernard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
and the Innocence Revolution,

WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE

DNA

REVOLUTION:

226 (Daniel Medwed ed., 2017). District courts could begin to address modification of the prejudice prong to pave the
way for the Supreme Court review.
27. Jed S. Rakoff, Mass Incarceration: The Silence of the Judges, N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(May 21, 2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/05/21/mass-incarceration-silence-judges/ [https://perma.cc/XM9F-8KXB].
28. Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: judicial Independence and Lawyer
Criticism of Courts, 25 HoSTRA L. REV. 703, 714-15 (1997).
29. The examples are far too numerous to recount. Sterling Harwood, Judicial
Activism: A RestrainedDefense 113-17 (Rev. Ed. 1996) (labeling certain jurists as "activists," including Supreme Court Justices John Marshall, Hugo Black, Benjamin
Cardozo, Warren Burger, William 0. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, Harry Blackmun, and in some areas, William Rehnquist); Jed S. Rakoff, U.S.
Dist. Judge, S.D.N.Y., Mass Incarceration and the "Fourth Principle," Speech at
Harvard Law School (Apr. 10, 2015) (transcript available at https://bol.bna.com/
[https://perma.cc/
judge-rakoff-speaks-out-at-harvardconference-full-speech/
9T6H-7YUK]); Eli Saslow, Against His BetterJudgment, WASH. POST (June 6, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/06/06/against-his-betterjudgment/?utm_term=.2e3c6c5fa2f6 (interview withJudge Mark Bennett of Iowa); Carrie Johnson & Marisa Penaloza, Judge Regrets Harsh Human Toll of Mandatory
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT

Minimum Sentences, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/

12/16/370991710/judge-regrets-harsh-human-toll-of-mandatory-minimumsentences [https://perma .cc/2MFM-9NQ9] (interview with Judge Gleeson in
which he states that mandatory minimums are "wrong" as a policy matter).
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wave of judicial speeches outside the courtroom.3 0 Justice
Sotomayor has traveled around the country speaking to a wide
range of audiences, and a recently-released film about Justice Ginsburg, the "Notorious RBG," includes commentary from the Justice
about a range of issues, notably sexism by her "brethren."3 ' District
and appellate court judges have been slow to follow the lead of the
public presence of Supreme Court justices. But public commentary
by lower court federal judges is on the rise, in great measure because of the lead set by the Supreme Court. Most recently, Judge
Frederic Block, citing instances of intentional misconduct by prosecutors that resulted in criminal convictions for innocent people,
called for an end to prosecutorial immunity in a post on the Marshall Project.3 2 Nevertheless, most judges are still reluctant to step
outside the perceived boundaries of their role.3 3

These judges, whose decisions, speeches, and writings address
the difficult issues of the day, represent a small minority of the
nearly 700 federal district court judges. They are willing to step
outside the safety of the narrow view of their role, at the risk of
significant public criticism, threats, and other unwelcome consequences. These judges act well within their authority, yet few federal court judges follow their lead.
Many years ago, Judge Frank Johnson said in defense of promoting civil rights, 'judicial activism is a duty-not an intrusion."3 4
Despite such commentary, the majority of federal district court
judges do not follow suit. This essay asks: Why don't all federal district courtjudges engage in such action? After all, they have lifetime
tenure and can therefore afford to be bold and carry out a broad
30. Jeffrey Rosen, Packing the Courts, N. TIMES (May 10, 2013), https://
www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/books/review/the-federalist-society-by-michael(reviewing
[https://perma.cc/JQU5-VKN2]
avery-and-danielle-mclaughlin.html
MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY: How CONSERVATIVES

TOOK

THE

LAw

BACK FROM LIBERALS

(2013)); Jonathan Turley, Opinion,

justice Scalia is a PoliticalPopstar - and That's Bad for the Supreme Court, WASH. POST
(Jan. 21, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti

cle/2011/01/21/AR2011012102923.html.

31. Ryan Reed, Watch Ruth Bader Ginsburg Talk Sexism, Equality in New Doc
Trailer, RoLLING STONE (Mar. 7, 2018, 9:49 PM) https://www.rollingstone.com/
movies/news/ruth-bader-ginsburg-reflects-on-gender-equality-in-new-doc-w517572
[https://perma.cc/NG6S-9EMX].
32. Fredric Block, Let's Put an End to ProsecutorialImmunity, MARSHALL PROJECT
(Mar. 13, 2018 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/03/13/let-sput-an-end-to-prosecutorial-immunity [https://perma.cc/95UW-QW9L].
33. Id.
34. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., judicial Activism Is a Duty-Not an Intrusion, 16
JUDGES'

J. 3, 4 (1977).
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view of justice. This essay calls for an "Engaged Judge" model and
examines the various factors that prevent many judges from acting
in such fashion. It concludes that judicial philosophy, distinctions
between law and politics, individual personalities, and a range of
other factors affect the willingness ofjudges to adopt a bold view of
their role.
THE ENGAGED JUDGE MODEL
Professor Jessica Roth identifies the judges who adopt a
broader view of their role as "new activists" despite her hesitation
about using the term "activist." 35 Currently, activism is a loaded and
pejorative term, implying that a judge follows a certain political or
ideological agenda and shapes decisions to fit that agenda, no matter what the law says.3 6 Furthermore, the term "new activist" has
become primarily associated with Cass R. Sunstein's use of the term
to describe a specific group of conservative federal judges, in his
book Radicals in Robes.3 7 Under the "veil of law" and a claim of a
return to the original Constitution, Sunstein's "new activist" judges

have transformed constitutional rights and rendered numerous citizens' claims nonjusticiable.38 These "new activist" judges purport to
revere history, and sometimes they are faithful to it. But, all too
often, they read the Constitution in a way that fits their political
views.39 Sunstein and others argue that these justices are the "activist" judges and that President Trump's appointees to the federal
bench are likely to fit within this mold of activism. 40 Thus, while the
term "activist" can be used to describe judges who engage in criminal justice and civil rights reform, it can also be used to describe
judges who make determinations based upon partisanship.
35. Roth, supra note 14 at 190 (noting that "activists" is often used to disparage an opinion a commentator disagrees with).
36. Id. But the term "activism" actually refers to the mindset of the judge
more than the nature of the opinion itself. These often overlap but it should not
be presumed that these are synonymous.
37. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005).
38. Id.
39. Id. at xiv.
40. Id.; See also Jason Zengerle, How the Trump Administration is Remaking the
Courts, NY TIMES MAG. (Aug. 22. 2018); Donald Trump's administration had 2 Supreme Court, 30 appellate court and 53 District court Judges confirmed. As of
January 2, 2019, 70 additional judicial nominations are pending. The process has
been conducted in close concert with the Federalist Society. Jason Zengerie, How
the Trump AdministrationIs Remaking the Courts, NY Times (Aug. 22, 2018), https://

www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/magazine/trump-remaking-courts-judiciary.html.
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Ultimately, few judges think of themselves as activists and many
judges despise the term. 1 I suggest that given the ambiguity and
controversy surrounding the term "activist," the judicial aspiration
should be that of the "Engaged Judge"-that is, a judge who acts in
the best traditions of the role by engaging in creative and often
bold solutions in order to advance a 'justice mission." That 'justice
mission" is to acknowledge that the constitution is a living, breathing document that must be interpreted to promote civil and constitutional rights and fairness to all. The contours of such a mission
are subject to challenge for being overbroad and without clear focus, but the longstanding views of scholars, such as Laurence Tribe,
provide its contours. 4 2 Although this 'justice mission" will be subject to ongoing controversy, this essay is premised upon a belief that
all judges should aspire toward this form of judicial engagement in
carefully restrained contexts, both in judicial opinions and, in a
more limited fashion, in public discourse outside of the courtroom.
The term "Engaged Judge" does not include judges who substitute
their own morality for the law or "result-oriented judging by tailoring legal principle to fit the judge's prior convictions about how he
43
wants the case to come out."

Engaged decision-making in criminal matters is essential for
many aspects of a case, including pretrial detention, plea-bargaining, and discovery practices. It is noteworthy that state court judges
in jurisdictions around the country have undertaken such an engaged role in individual cases and have influenced changes in their
states' respective criminal justice systems. 4 4 The majority of federal
41. STERLINc HARWOOD, JUDICIAL ACnvisM: A RESTRAINED DEFENSE 47-52 (rev.
ed. 1996) (providing quotations from various judges who disdain the term activist).
42. See Laurence H. Tribe, Bush v. Gore and Its Disguises: FreeingBush v. Gore
from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARv. L. REv. 170, 300-01 (2001).

43. David Luban, judicialActivism vs. Judicial Restraint:A Close Look at the Bork
CHARLEs GARDNER GEYH,

Nomination, 7 PHIL. & PUB. Pot. QUART. 4, 10 (1987);
WHAT'S LAw GOT To Do WITH IT? 4 (2011).
44. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt,
AND PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 1

CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, JUDGES

(2002), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/

default/files/JudgesProblemSolvingCourtsl.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6CR-ZM8Q]
(documenting the "growing number ofjudges around the country [who] have begun to test new ways of doing justice, re-engineering the ways that state courts
address such everyday problems as mental illness, quality-of-life crime, drugs and
child neglect. These innovators are united by a common belief: that judges have an
obligation to attempt to solve the problems that bring people to court, whether it
be as victims, defendants, litigants or witnesses."). A recent symposium, Judicial
Responsibility for Justice in Criminal Courts, promoted the best practices of courts
around the country that have engaged in ajudicial mission to change and improve
the quality ofjustice delivered in state criminal courts. Symposium, judicial Respon-
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a phenomenon

that cannot be wholly explained by the fact that most state court
judges are elected and federal judges are appointed.4 6
Sentencing in criminal cases is another context in which
judges should act as Engaged Judges and should utilize their discretion to impose a sentence that the court believes to be fair. Sentencing is quintessentially a judicial function, bounded as it is by the
Sentencing Guidelines.
Beyond issues pertaining to the criminal justice system, judges
should be ardent protectors of individuals' constitutional rights.
This is, perhaps, the primary context for the Engaged Judge model.
Issues arising under common law and certain other legal matters
may call for less judicial engagement because there is less room to
exercise discretion. But, as Ronald Dworkin has argued, the "difficult clauses of the Bill of Rights" are ripe for judicial interpretation.4 7 Consequently, the broader context of constitutional and civil
rights is where the Engaged Judge model should predominate.4 8
Judges, legal scholars, historians, political scientists, and philosophers have long debated the fundamental and varied reasons why
such engagement is essential to preserving and expanding democracy.49 Consequently, the broader context of constitutional and civil
rights is where the Engaged Judge model should predominate. Assuming that a significant number of federal judges may believe that
the judiciary is tasked with preserving and expanding democracy,
why do so few act upon it?
FACTORS COUNSELING AGAINST JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT
One of the most prevalent reasons why the majority of judges
cannot be described as "Engaged Judges" is judicial philosophy. For
all judges, the overriding concern is, of course, maintaining the respect for the judiciary. Thus, the bedrock of judicial ethics is dignity, impartiality, and independence, because these principles
preserve the public's trust in the judiciary.5 0 These principles are
sibilityforjustice in Criminal Courts, 46 HOFSTRA L. REv. 21 (2017). These state courts
presume the judicial "activist" posture that is controversial in federal courts. Id.
45. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

(2007) (exploring factors driving federal judiciary deci-

sion-making).
46. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

47. Ronald Dworkin,

TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

48. Roth, supra note 14, at 252.
49. GregJones, ProperjudicialActivism, 14
50. See id.

147 (1978).

REGENT

U. L. Rjv. 141, 168 (2001).
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essential to maintaining the rule of law and for protecting individual rights in a democracy.5' In order for judges to maintain independence and impartiality, they must be perceived to adjudicate
matters based upon an application of what is viewed as "law" to the
facts presented and not based upon ideological or personal perspectives. "Judges have no weapons, no armies. They depend on
their moral authority." 52 If the public believed that judicial outcomes are not the result of independent and impartial reasoning,
and thus are not objective resolutions, judicial opinions would lose
their moral authority. Respect for the independence of the judiciary may rest upon an unacknowledged slender reed of trust, and
judges, well aware of the tenuous nature of public trust, may resist
the Engaged Judge model for fear that they will be perceived as
partisan, rather than as objective adjudicators.
The quest to maintain judicial independence and impartiality
is closely related to another rationale for why judges may avoid
adopting the Engaged Judge model: the desire to maintain the distinction between law and politics. Ajudge who adopts a broad view
of her role and expresses her views about a particular matter may
be concerned that she will be perceived as acting akin to a politician, who is seeking to achieve a specific goal, rather than as a fair
adjudicator.
The extent that this concern plays a significant role in judicial
opinions is unclear. Political scientists and legal scholars have studied and opined about judicial decision-making for decades. Recent
empirical research finds that the influences on judicial decisionmaking are "complex and multivariate." 5 3 This literature examines
various models of judicial decision-making, all of which point to
mixed motives for the court's opinions. Judicial philosophy is one
of many variables.
The belief that judges merely follow the "law" was the
predominate theory of judicial decision-making for many years.
This theory was derived from the formalist view of the role and operation of the law, which was known as the "legal model." The legal
model posited that judges "bracketed out extraneous influences on
their decision-making .

.

. to base their decisions upon applicable

law." 54

The notion was that judges decide cases solely in
facts and
accordance with legal rules that are uncontroversial principles.
51. See id.
52. Mark Alcott, DefendingJudges, Standing Up for the Rule of Law, 90 N.Y. ST. B.

Ass'N J. 20, 20 (2018).
53. Geyh, supra note 43 at 4.
54. Id.
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Flaws in the logic of the legal model became apparent because,
for example, "[s]tatutes and constitutions are riddled with ambiguous language."5 5 Over time, the legal realist movement debunked
formalism (and, thus, the legal model) and scholars acknowledged
that judges use what are considered "extralegal factors," such as a
judge's own ideology and personal characteristics in deciding
cases.5 6 Legal scholars worked with behavioral psychologists and developed an "attitudinal model" of decision making.5 7 Its premise is
that when judges say that they are merely following the law, the
reality is that their decisions are actually influenced by their individual attitudes or ideological views. This attitudinal model was challenged, in turn, by the "strategic choice model." This model
theorized that judges seek to have their policy views implemented
and recognize that this can only be accomplished with the support
of other institutional actors.5 8 Thus, judges' opinions are strategic
to accomplish long term policy goals. In other words, as Charles
Gardner Geyh notes, judges' "impulse to act upon their attitudes is
tempered by savvy for the politically possible."5 9
Other theories of judicial decision-making abound. For example, some social psychologists argue that judges are driven by social
acceptance and thus judicial decision-making is driven by the audiences that a particular judge seeks to convince or impress-i.e., fellow judges, higher courts, the bar, the public, or the media.6 0
Another model, the economic model, suggests that judges are selfinterested and seek to maximize their power, prestige, influence,
income, and leisure. Thus, some judges may structure their decisions to increase their appointment to higher office. 6
Perhaps the most cogent view explaining judicial decision-making is Judge Richard Posner's view that judges are pragmatists; that
is, they balance their discretion with pursing traditional legal model
55. Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence offurisprudentialConsiderations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 L. & Soc'v

REV. 135, 137 (2006).
56. Frank B. Cross, Law Is Politics, in WHAT'S

LAw GOT To Do WITH IT? 92, 93
(Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011).
57. Geyh, supra note 43, at 5.
58. Virginia A. Hettinger et al., ComparingAttitudinal and Strategic Accounts of
Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 Am. J. OF L. & POL. 1 (2004);
THOMAS H. HAMMOND ET AL., STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT (2005).
59. Geyh, supra note 43, at 2.
60. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPEc:TIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR,

21-24 (2006).

61. Geyh, supra note 43, at 3.
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standards.6 2 The pragmatist judges seeks the "best" outcome which
is a combination of common sense, respect for precedent, and an
appreciation of society's needs.6 3

Needless to say, these varied theories do not provide a consensus that explains how and why judges decide cases as they do and

why certain judges tend to be engaged judges or speak out more
than others. But this research clearly demonstrates that external
factors, in addition to "law," play a role in judicial decision-making.
Furthermore, these competing models are intertwined with an effort to discern what judges mean by law and how law differs from
politics and political decisions. This fundamental issue-how is law
different from politics-drives a good deal of the scholarly discussion about the role of judges and the perspectives of members of
the judiciary. Scholars acknowledge that law cannot readily be separated from politics because politics is the "art and science of government" and the judiciary is a part of the government.6 4 As Judge
Posner noted, "law is shot through with politics."6 5 And other schol-

ars note that "[b] ecause the judicial system is part of our government, it is a central part of our politics." 66
The relationship between law and politics is blurry and often
context-dependent. 6 7 Laws are often written broadly so that discretion is inevitable. Consequently, ideological or other influences are
embedded in judicial decision-making. 6 8 But, acknowledging that
the exercise of judicial discretion has political aspects does not infer that judges lack independence, nor does it diminish the importance of adjudicating disputes based on "law." This is because
judges are a different kind of "political" than legislators, and their
decisions are subject to different constraints. So long as the judge
exercises discretion within a reasonable range as defined by rules
and norms of the courts and decides the case based on applying the
RiCHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 230 (2008).
63. Geyh supra note 43, at 105-06.
64. Cross, supra note 56, at 91.
65. Posner, supra note 62, at 9.
66. Cross, supra note 56, at 92-93. Some argue that law is simply a subset of
politics, that is, law incorporates room for judicial discretion and the discretion
judges engage in is influenced by their political ideology. In such case, judicial
discretion permits judges to be pragmatic and make decisions they believe to be
sound.
67. See Baum, supra note, 60, at 118-27 (arguing that law and policy are too
intertwined to disentangle and to attempt to do so is misdirected).

62.

68. See Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study ofJudicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics,

Science, and Humility, in
ed., 2011).

WHAT'S LAw GOT To

Do

WITH IT?

(Charles Gardner Geyh
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law to the facts, the judge acts within the scope of his or her authority. Ajudge's decision may advance a particular ideological commitment, but adjudicating a dispute is a presumptively fact-driven
evaluation. Ultimately, what matters, or should matter, is "whether
implementing an ideological preference is the judge's conscious
motive or is simply a subconscious effect of decision-making." 69
Thus, a judge can write or speak out about an issue as long as
the expression of that view does not determine the outcome of the
case. For example, if the law is clear, judges are duty-bound to follow precedent. Judges may express their disagreement with applicable precedents, but they are nevertheless required to uphold these
precedents. Famously, in the antislavery cases noted by Professor
Roth, judges made plain their personal views about the abhorrence
of the fugitive slave laws, but nevertheless followed the law. 70 In one
of the more remarkable judicial speeches, Judge Joseph Rockwell
Swan enforced fugitive slave laws even as he advocated against
them:
As a citizen I would not deliberately violate the Constitution or
the law by interference with fugitives from service; but if a
weary, frightened slave should appeal to me to protect him
from his pursuers, it is possible I might momentarily forget my
allegiance to the law and the Constitution and give him a covert from those who were upon his track. There are, no doubt,
many slaveholders who would follow the impulses of human
sympathy; and if I did, and were prosecuted, condemned and
imprisoned, and brought by my council before this tribunal on
a habeas corpus, and were there permitted to pronounce judgment in my own case, I trust I should have the moral courage
to say, before God and country, as I am now compelled to say,
under the solemn duties of a judge, bound by my official oath
to sustain the supremacy of the Constitution and the law, THE
PRISONER MUST BE REMANDED. 7
More recently, Judge Jack B. Weinstein defended the "unredeemable" even though he was required to send them to
prison.7 2 Case law is replete with such cases.7 3

There is certainly a consensus that the lack of fidelity to existing law and the tailoring ofjudicial decisions to ajudge's ideolog69. Geyh, supra note 43, at 5.
70. Roth, supra note 14, at 229.
71. Ex Parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77, 188-89 (1859).
72. Alan Feuer, This Judge Defends 'Unredeemables' Even as He Sends Them to

Prison, NY TIMES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/08/nyregion
/this-judge-defends-unredeemables-even-as-he-sends-them-to-prison.html.
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ical convictions are outside the bounds of acceptable judicial
decision-making. But in many cases, laws are ambiguous, and
judges are required to exercise discretion in interpreting the ambiguous language. This is where judicial philosophy matters. When
exercising judicial discretion, the degree to which ajudge's individual decision is bound by other factors is often a matter of degree,
and "empirical research has clearly demonstrated that judicial ideology is a statistically significant determinant of judicial
outcomes."7
Judges need to ensure that they do not act akin to politicians
by letting political ideologies dictate the outcome of cases. But
judges may state their opinion about a law, as exemplified by Judges
Swan and Weinstein, without crossing the law-versus-politics boundary. Furthermore, when judges exercise discretion they must do so
within the confines of applicable constraints. If done properly,
opining about social issues and exercising judicial discretion do not
undermine impartiality and independence. Nevertheless, the vast
majority ofjudicial decisions are confined to the discussion of legal
principles and existing law, even though empirical data establishes
that individual judicial proclivities play an important role when the
law is less determinate. A key example is that after the Sentencing
Guidelines provided clarity, inter-judge variations in sentencing
dropped because judges were required to follow the guidelines,
even though many judges disagreed with the Sentencing Guidelines.7 5 Expressing a viewpoint about the Sentencing Guidelines
would not undermine a judge's objectivity in applying the guidelines, but the perceived need to maintain the veil that outcomes are
driven solely by "law" prevails. Legitimacy is perceived to depend
upon it. This perception influences judicial philosophy and may
weigh against "judicial engagement."
In addition to judicial philosophy and the need to maintain
the distinction between law and politics, judges may avoid becoming "Engaged Judges" because of their personalities. Judges are a
particularly cautious group. Judges are people who have "perfected
the art of avoiding controversy." 7 6 As former Judge Nancy Gertner
candidly acknowledges, judges are timid and driven more by calen73. For example, Bernard Meyer wrote an extraordinary opinion in Engel v.
Vitale. 191 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1959). See David M. Schimmel, The Battle over School Prayer:
How Engel v. Vitale Changed America, 116 AM. J. EDUC. 453, 455 (2010).
74. Cross, supra note 56, at 92.
75. Cross, supra note 56, at 110.
76. Nancy Gertner, Opinions I Should Have Written, 110 N.w. U. L. REv. 423,
432 (2016).

Reprinted with the permission of NYU Journal of Law and Business of New York University School of Law

2019]

ASPIRING TO A MODEL OF THE ENGAGED JUDGE

407

dar control than fairness. "The notion is to decide matters as narrowly as possible . . . ." Such a cautious approach may enhance
judges' reputations and the role of the courts.7 7
Of course, in addition to judicial philosophy, personality, and
other factors, a judge's predisposition toward the facts may be determinative in a case. Credibility evaluation of witnesses is affected
by ajudge's background, personality, and various individual factors.
As an anonymous district court judge said: "Give me some ambiguous facts and I will tell you what the justice is." Most judges, however, are not this forthcoming or do not adopt a similar view. It is
unclear whether individuals with cautious temperaments are more
likely to pursue a career as a judge, or whether restrained decisionmaking is a byproduct of the role of being a judge. Nevertheless,
the judiciary is not the home of changemakers.
Unlike the majority of federal judges, Engaged Judges are not
afraid to express their viewpoints about social issues and help advance social change. Their individual reward systems play a significant role in their approaches to judicial decision-making. For
example, Judge Weinstein, who serves as perhaps the iconic and
legendary Engaged Judge, does what he considers the right thing,
no matter the consequences. He notes that virtue is its own reward.7 8 Many Engaged Judges seemingly appear to adopt this perspective and exercise discretion as they deem necessary and
appropriate.7" They are not the judges, described by former Judge
Gertner, who seek to duck, evade, or avoid deciding cases. Engaged
Judges are willing to take positions and speak out, even at the risk
of reversal or public disapproval. Even though others may view
these judges as pathbreakers, for better or worse, Engaged Judges
believe that they are doing justice. For example, Judge John
Coughenour of the Western District of Washington, who presided
over the trial of the Ahmed Ressam, the "Millennium Bomber," sentenced him to twenty-two years.80 During Ressam's sentencing,
Judge Coughenour, a Reagan appointee, made an emotional
speech unleashing "a broadside against secret tribunals" and other
war on terrorism tactics that abandoned "the ideals that set our na77. Id.
78. Arnold H. Lubasch,Jack Weinstein: Creative U.S.fudge Who DisdainsRobe and
High Bench, NY TIMES (May 28, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/28/
nyregion/jack-weinstein-creative-us-judge-who-disdains-robe-and-high-bench.html.
79. In part, this may be that these judges do not seek to, or they recognize
that they will not, be appointed to the appellate bench.

80. U.S. v. Ressam, No. CR99-666C-001, 2005 Westlaw 6582294 (W.D. Wash.
2005).
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tion apart." 8 ' The sentence issued by Judge Coughenour was ultimately reversed and remanded by the Ninth Circuit because, under
the Sentencing Guidelines, Ressam should have received at least
sixty-five years. On remand, Judge Coughenour again imposed a
sentence of twenty-two years to the ire of the government. 82 The
sentence was appealed and remanded for a second time, and this
time the case was remanded to a different judge for resentencing.8 3
While Judge Coughenour's initial sentence did not stand, his critique of secret tribunals endured because he was willing to assert his
independence despite the Circuit Court's disapproval.
Similarly, Judge Shira Scheindlin, in a much-criticized series of
actions by the Second Circuit, was removed from the "stop and
frisk" case, ostensibly for improper application of a "related case"
rule and because of a series of newspaper articles that were not
even in the record before the Second Circuit.8 4 The Second Circuit
opined that interviews she gave to the media, even though they did
not discuss the case, cast doubt upon her impartiality.8 5 The case
was perceived to be a political football, with the New York City
Mayor's Office and its counsel consistently casting aspersions on the
judge.8 6 Judge Scheindlin, with support of counsel and various lawyers and law professors, clashed with the Circuit over its findings
and remedy.8 7 She remained an Engaged Judge.
Justice, not mere "law," drives the decisions of Engaged Judges.
But these judges do not rule based on ideology alone. Their deci81. Hal Bernton & Sara

Jean

Green, Ressam Judge Decries U.S. Tactics, SEATTLE

TIMES (July 28, 2005), https://web.archive.org/web/20070101213103/ http://se
attletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002406378_ressam27m.html [https://
perma.cc/333S-8BZ5]. Judge Coughenour then wrote an op-ed criticizing former
judge and Attorney General appointee Michael Mukasey's view that the U.S.
Courts are not a safe and proper forum in which to try terrorism cases. SeeJohn C.
Coughner, How to Try a Terrorist, NY TIMES (Nov. 1, 2007), https://
www.nytimes.com/2007/1 1/01/opinion/Olcoughenour.html.
82. Kirk Johnson, New Sentence is Imposed in Bomb Plot from 1999, NY TIMES
(Oct. 24, 2012) https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/us/millennium-bombersentenced-to-37-years-in-prison.html.

83. U.S. v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2012).
84. Ligon v. New York City, 538 F. App'x. 101 at 102-03 (2d Cir. 2013).

85. Id.
86. Benjamin Weiser; Shira Scheindlin, judge Behind Stop-and-Frisk Ruling, Will
Step Down, NY TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/nyregion/shira-scheindlin-judge-behind-stop-and-frisk-ruling-will-step-down.htrnl.
87. Benjamin Weiser, DepartingJudge Offer Blunt Defense of Ruling in Stop-andFrisk, NY TIMES (May 2, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/02/nyregion/
departing-judge-offers-blunt-defense-of-ruling-that-ended-stop-and-frisk.html.
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sions are well-reasoned and are based on law.88 They maintain judicial independence and act impartially while also advancing their
justice missions.
JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT THROUGH PUBLIC DISCOURSE
Judges also have the opportunity to effectuate change through
their role as public figures. While judges often speak outside the
courtroom, at conferences and at other professional events, most of
these talks do not involve advocacy of particular causes or positions.
For example, Judge Learned Hand often gave talks, but most of his
talks were about judicial restraint and not advocacy of various positions. Aside from certain restrictions, such as the prohibition
against commentary in pending and impending cases,8 9 a judge's
role does not prevent engagement in the causes and controversies
of the day. For example, Judge Louis Pollak made numerous
speeches and participated on panels about issues of importance,
including the role of religion and religious institutions in public
life.9 0 Furthermore, judges who are locally elected often run for reelection based upon their previous opinions, and their electioneering often consists of speeches advocating for the righteousness
'

of their decisions. 9

One factor that may deter federal judges from engaging in
such advocacy is the concern with the public's perception about the
impartiality of judges. But, there is no clarity about the extent to
which ajudge's public discourse has a harmful effect upon that perception. In fact, such public discourse may enhance the public's
88. See Frank Sullivan, Nancy Vaidik, & Sarah Evans Barker, Three Views from
the Bench, in WHAT's LAw GOT To Do WITH IT? 328 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed.,

2011).
89. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUcT, r. 2.10 ("A judge shall not make any public statement that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair
the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any court, or make any nonpublic statement that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing."); see also
Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that a Minnesota
rule limiting campaign speech violates the First Amendment).
90. See, e.g., Symposium, Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 61 FORDHAM L REv. 19 (1992),
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://
www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=2996&context=flr; Samuel J. Silverman,
Louis H. Pollak, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 311 (1978); Dennis Hevesi, Louis H. Pollack,
Civil Rights Advocate and Federaljudge, Dies at 89, NY TIMEs (May 12, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/us/louis-pollak-judge-and-civil-rights-advocatedies-at-89.html [https://perma.cc/UFP2-9AFT].
91. Melinda Gann Hall, On the Cataclysm of Judicial Elections and Other Popular
Anti-Democratic Myths, in WHAT'S LAW GOT TO Do WITH IT?, 226 (Charles Gardner

Geyh ed., 2011).
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view about the role of the court and about its independence and
impartiality. Judge Jed Rakoffs statement that it is the judiciary's
responsibility to end mass incarceration and his various published
essays engage and educate the public.9 2 Judge Block's recent call to
end prosecutorial immunity spotlighted a longstanding and key issue in the country's quest to address wrongful convictions of the
innocent. 3 None of these public opinions necessarily have an impact upon any of these judges' ability to be impartial in future cases
and to apply facts to law. The type of public advocacy that Judge
Rakoff and Judge Block have engaged in does not undermine the
public's respect for the judiciary and is consistent with the letter
and spirit of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
However, if a vast majority of the federal judiciary consistently
gave such speeches and published opinion pieces about their ideological views, the perception of the judicial role is likely to shift.
Perhaps it will shift in a positive direction with the public having a
greater respect for the judiciary and the role of law, but the fear is
otherwise. The judiciary, the bar, and some scholars worry that
greater public advocacy will call the judiciary's legitimacy into
question.94

Of course, one must ask: what is legitimacy, and whose view of
legitimacy matters? Legitimacy is the "political capital" that institutions need "in order to be effective to get their decisions accepted
by others and be successfully implemented." 5 Respect for the judiciary hinges upon a "veil of law" where the public has a reservoir of
good will for the courts because the public believes that the institution has the right to make certain decisions. 6 Courts are generally
perceived to be weak institutions because they have neither the
power of the sword (police agencies) nor the power of the purse
(the treasury).
The core of the judiciary's legitimacy is the judiciary's social
contract with the public. In accordance with this social contract, the
92. Joel Cohen, DoJudges Contribute To Injustices? A Conversation withJudgefed
Rakoff, ABA JOURNAL (April 13, 2017) http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
judge-jed-rakoff joel cohenbroken scales [https://perma.cc/6N2F-BAD5].
93. Frederic Block, Opinion, ProsecutorsAren't Above the Law: Gov. Cuonw Must
Sign Legislation Creatingan Oversight Commission, NY DAILY NEWS (July 30, 2018)
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-prosecutors-arent-above-the-law20180726-story.html.
94. Roth, supra note 14.
95. James L. Gibson, judging the Politics ofJudging: Are Politicians in Robes Inevitably Illegitimate?, in WHAT's LAW GOT To Do WITH IT? 281, 283 (Charles Gardner

Geyh ed., 2011).
96. Gibson, supra note 95, at 283-84.
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public trusts the judiciary to rely on its expertise in rendering decisions by carefully considering the facts and applying law to those
facts.9 7 Thus, the judiciary relies upon the public's perception that
courts are fair, impartial, and act in accordance with the rule of law.
This perception that judges are impartial is in part dependent upon
the view thatjudges are independent from the political branches of
government. 8 However, it is unclear whether the public would in
fact lose trust in the judiciary if judges were to engage in advocacy
through public discourse.
Typically, the bar and the bench are self-referential and view
their own perception of judicial legitimacy as the benchmark for
the system's legitimacy. Thus, the aforementioned fear associated
with increased judicial public advocacy may reflect judges' views,
but the public may believe otherwise. Extensive data reveals that the
public has mixed views ofjudges as arbiters of the law or as political
actors influenced by their ideology. 9 Citizens have diverse understandings and expectations of courts that do not mirror the way in
which lawyers and judges perceive judicial legitimacy. In a 2006
study, citizens of Kentucky were asked about their expectations of a
good Supreme Courtjustice. The results of this study indicated that
the public expected a good judge to protect people without power
(72.9% of respondents), strictly follow the law (71.8%), and state
policy positions during campaigns (64.2%).100
This study demonstrates that citizens have a confused and inconsistent view of judges and their roles. For example, "strictly following the law" is not always consistent with "protecting people
without power."1 0 1 Interestingly, these results did not vary based
upon the respondents' educational backgrounds or their knowledge about the judicial function. 0 2 However, one significant variance based on the education level of the respondents was the
extent to which judges should be "more than politicians in
robes."1 0 3 Respondents with lower levels of education believed that
97. Gibson, supra note 95, at 284.
98. Gibson, supra note 95, at 283-84.
99. Keith Bybee, The Rule of Law is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!, in WHAT'S

Do WITH IT? 306, 307, 312-14 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011);
Gibson, supra note 95, at 281.
100. Gibson, supra note 95, at 289.
101. Ex Parte Bushnell, supra note 71; Feuer, supra notes 72. Years ago, Judge
Rockwell made plain his contempt for fugitive slave laws even though he was constrained to enforce them. Similarly, Judge Weinstein criticized the treatment of an
indigent criminal defendant even though he was required to send him to prison.
102. Gibson, supra note 95 at 294.
103. Id.

LAw GOT To
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judges should represent majority opinions, implement majority ideology, and perhaps reflect their own partisanship.1 0 4 Conversely, respondents with higher levels of education believed that the
judiciary is worthy of respect when it exercises discretion in making
independent and principled judgments.1 0 5
Given this important disparity in the respondents' perspectives,
disagreement about the effect that public commentary by judges
will have on the legitimacy of the judiciary is likely. As scholarJames
L. Gibson notes, "to the extent that popular confidence in the judiciary is a standard for evaluating the behaviors of judges, we must
be aware that the sources of confidence are disparate and perhaps
even contested, and that popular and elite expectations of judges
may not be consonant." 0 6 Some citizens may prefer to know a
judge's views. Additionally, some citizens may view Judge Judy or
similar television personae as the embodiment of a legitimate
judge. For some, Judge Judy is the face of the law and she expresses
her views clearly.
But "legal elites" perceive independence and impartiality from
a different vantage point. "Legal elites" likely believe that if judges
were to engage in public advocacy, there will be a tendency for the
public to perceive that judges are merely acting as another branch
of politics by seeking to implement their political views. Furthermore, "legal elites" likely fear that if lawyers and judges were to explain the nature and process of judicial decision-making, and the
effects that various external factors have upon a court's decision,
respect for the courts will be eroded. Because "legal elites" have
these beliefs and because there is not a clear consensus among citizens, there is not a definitive approach to whether judges should
publicly acknowledge their ideological predispositions and views.
To some, judges' speeches and articles may promote the long-term
legitimacy of the federal judiciary, but to others, judicial public advocacy may produce the opposite effect.
CONCLUSION
Overall, increased public education about the role of the judiciary is essential. It is important for judges to educate the public
about the legal system and the role that the judiciary plays in our
democracy. Public awareness about the significant impact judicial
decisions can have upon daily lives is essential. Justice Sotomayor's
104. Gibson, supra note 95 at 295.
105. Id.
106. Gibson, supra note 95, at 299.
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numerous talks about the legal system have been inspirational to

young and old alike, especially about her background, career, and
role on the bench.1 07 Judges can also educate the public about the
meaning of "impartiality." Our judicial system is predicated on the
notion that judges do not decide cases based upon ideology, but
there is little, if any, public acknowledgement that ideology plays a
role in decision-making. This lack of public awareness can lead to
public cynicism, because the public may believe, upon finding out
that ideology does play a role in judicial decision-making, that
judges are influenced solely by ideology and are therefore not im-

partial. Consequently, the public needs to understand the difficult
task of judging and the role played by various factors including ideology. Impartiality is not the absence of ideology. It is a recognition
that ideology may influence a judge, but that the court is cognizant
of that influence and can render a fair decision upon the matters

presented, regardless of ideological proclivities. 0 8
Beyond public education about the role of courts and judicial
decision-making, judges need to carefully evaluate the extent to
which they should offer their ideological perspectives. Judges must
consider the extent to which public advocacy might be perceived as
having an impact upon a future case. Some members of the public
may view both Judge Rakoff's statements about judicial responsibility to end mass incarceration and Judge Block's opinion piece
about prosecutorial immunity, as compromising their independence. Despite the fact that both judges can and would render fair
decisions, there may be a perception that they lack impartiality in
cases that relate to their public advocacy. This would be unfortunate because their discourses serve an important purpose. Judges
should not feel constrained to educate the public, but the decision
to do so and the content of the public discourse must be carefully
tempered in light of the potential perception that a judge has
prejudged a particular matter in accordance with the judge's
viewpoint.
Encouraging a more engaged judiciary in the public sphere is
likely to be controversial in the current political and judicial climate. Nevertheless, there is certainly a need to reevaluate the traditional model of discouraging judicial advocacy within and outside
107. See, e.g. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice for the United States
Supreme Court, NYU Commencement Speech (May 16, 2012).
108. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2011) (defining impartiality as the "absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular
parties or classes of parties, as well as maintaining an open mind in considering
issues that may come before ajudge").
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the courtroom. Perhaps the United States has entered a new era
where the federal judiciary will be significantly changed and seemingly hopelessly politicized. The cynical and disturbing failure of
the Senate to appoint Merrick Garland, by all accounts a fair and
open-minded jurist,10 9 was shocking. Judge Garland was universally
applauded as a person of impeccable integrity and fairness who:
[i]s obviously brilliant but lacks arrogance and that is refreshing... What makes him uniquely well qualified is that he has
tried cases both as a prosecutor and as a defense attorney. It is
an important qualification for service on the Supreme
Court. . . The fact that Judge Garland has tried cases makes
him unique. He writes thoroughly reasoned opinions whether
you agree with him or not. 11 0
Despite his remarkable qualifications, Senator Mitch McConnell blocked consideration of Judge Garland's nomination."' Instead, Leonard Leo, the conservative legal activist who is the
executive Vice President of the Federalist Society and an adviser to
the Trump Administration on court appointments, led the conservative movement to quickly appoint a stunning number of federal judges, to date: two Supreme Court appointments and eightythree lower court appointments to the bench ofjurists."

2

The con-

servative movement calls this a "promising reorientation of the judiciary." 1 13 The American Bar Association ("ABA"), on the other
hand, gave four recent federal court nominations an unqualified
rating, including Leonard Grasz for the Eighth Circuit." 4 The ABA
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GARLAND TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES To THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUlICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE (June

21, 2016).

111. Charles Homans, Mitch McConnell Got Everything He Wanted. But at What
Cost?, NY TIMES MAG. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/
magazine/mcconnell-senate-trump.html.
112. The Judicial Puppet Master, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.us
news.com/news/the-report/articles/2017-10-27/leonard-leo-is-calling-the-shotson-judicial-appointments; Edward Whelan, Trump's Stellar Judges, NAT. REV. (Jan.
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questioned whether Grasz would follow the law and said that he
would be unable "to separate his role as an advocate from that of a
judge.""'5 The ABA noted that: "Mr. Grasz's passionately-held social
agenda appeared to overwhelm and obscure the ability to exercise
dispassionate and unbiased judgment. In sum, the evaluators found
that temperament issues particularly bias and lack of open-mindedness were problematic."" 6
This is unparalleled. The notion that federal judges will be appointed, who are rated unqualified because they do not follow the
law, is disturbing.' 1 7 Fair-mindedness seems to be an unimportant
characteristic in today's political climate, and therefore federal trial
courts around the country may become filled with ideologues.",,
Perhaps some of these newly appointed jurists will be more than
"radicals in robes," who alter constitutional values and tradition and
uphold the principles of stare decisis. That remains to be seen.
Engaged Judges have played an important role in advancing
liberty and equality for all. Furthermore, increased judicial engagement may help the public realize that judicial decisions have important implications for criminal and civil liberties and may garner
support for the preservation of these rights.
Overall, the legitimacy of the judiciary and the preservation of
the tenuous balance between the branches of government requires
the judiciary to reaffirm its commitment to the role of law and to
the impartiality of its judges. Within these constraints, judges
should adopt the model of the Engaged Judge and promote greater
democracy and respect for civil and constitutional rights within
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their opinions. Outside of the courtroom, judicial speeches and articles can have immense value, but must be conducted carefully.
The judiciary has a critical role to play in enhancing the public's
understanding of the judiciary's role and the meaning of impartiality, which affect the public's respect for the judicial system.
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